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Abstract: In the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics as characterized by Heisenberg,
probabilities relate to the statistics of measurement outcomes on ensembles of systems and
to individual measurement events via the actualization of quantum potentiality. Here, brief
summaries are given of a series of key results of different sorts that have been obtained since
the final elements of the Copenhagen interpretation were offered and it was explicitly named so by
Heisenberg—in particular, results from the investigation of the behavior of quantum probability since
that time, the mid-1950s. This review shows that these developments have increased the value to
physics of notions characterizing the approach which were previously either less precise or mainly
symbolic in character, including complementarity, indeterminism, and unsharpness.
Keywords: quantum probability; potentiality; complementarity; uncertainty relations; Copenhagen
interpretation; indefiniteness; indeterminism; causation; randomness
1. Introduction
The orthodox approach to quantum theory emerged primarily from interactions in Copenhagen
and elsewhere from the work of Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, and Wolfgang Pauli, depending also
on contributions of Max Born, and was largely set out by 1927, cf. [1–4]. After various criticisms of
the initial form, Bohr focused more strongly on complementarity in the 1930s, and Heisenberg—in
a strong response of 1955 in which the basis of the approach can be considered to have been
essentially finalized—added the new element of actualization of potentiality to its approach to quantum
probability [5]. Since then, much attention has been paid to newly emerging alternative treatments of
quantum physics, such as Bohmian mechanics and collapse-free (e.g., many-worlds) mechanics, that
use quantum probability and the quantum formalism. Indeed, with a few exceptions (e.g., [2,6–8] and
others mentioned below) relatively little attention has been paid to the implications of new research
for the more orthodox, Copenhagen approach. Here, a non-exhaustive but wide-ranging series of
theoretical results, several directly related to experiment, obtained since the work of Heisenberg related
to quantum probability, is discussed, which, by articulating more precisely and better clarifying the
application of its basic notions, including complementarity, uncertainty, and indeterminacy, which were
before either less precise or even merely symbolic, further demonstrates the value of this approach.
Beyond the basic notion that the probability of any observed future physical event in a system can
be found via the quantum state using the Born rule given the results of a complete set of measurements
on it, the character of quantum probabilities on this Copenhagen approach is discussed in the
next section; experimentally verified results demonstrating new quantum complementarities are
considered in Section 3; theoretical developments involving unsharpness and quantum measurement
are considered in Section 4; novel explications of indeterminism and randomness are considered
in Section 5.
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2. Probability in the Copenhagen Approach
The Copenhagen approach to quantum theory generally gives primacy to measured
phenomena—with any results regarding the measured system being given in relation to the entire
experimental situation in which each arises and with the records of measuring devices being classical
describable—without being positivist and remaining essentially realist. Although Bohr’s notion of
complementarity was the greatest influence early in the development of the approach—as noted, for
example, by Jan Faye [9] and Arkady Plotnitsky [10,11]—it was later supplanted in a development
toward more precise and mathematically advanced treatments of the effect, as exhibited in Section 3
(also cf. [12])—and even explicitly extended to situations involving entanglement as, arguably, thought
by Bohr to be the case, as Don Howard has argued [13]. The Copenhagen approach explicitly named
as such is that circumscribed by Werner Heisenberg [5] in which measurement corresponds to the
actualization of a potential physical situation where a single value appears from among a set of possible
values that were not certain (cf. [14,15] for analyses of the fundamentals of this version, specifically
considered here). The essential mathematical formalism of non-relativistic QM emerged with work
of Paul Dirac and John von Neumann, with Hilbert-space as the space of individual system states
(cf. [1–3] and Chapter. 7 in [16]), forming the context for its later extension, discussed in detail below,
cf. [2,14,17].
A succinct overview of the role of probability in the Copenhagen interpretation was given by
Heisenberg, who gave the interpretation its name: “. . . the probability function does not in itself
represent a course of events in the course of time. It represents a tendency for events and our
knowledge of events. The probability function can be connected with reality only if one essential
condition is fulfilled: if a new measurement is made to determine a certain property of the system. Only
then does the probability function allow us to calculate the probable result of the new measurement”
(pp. 46–47, [18] ; cf. [15]).
2.1. Quantum States and Probability
An (O, S, p) formulation of general physical theory serves as a basic formal framework for the
non-relativistic theory of QM [19,20]: To each physical system, one can associate with the set of all
associated sharp observables (Hermitian self-adjoint operators) O and the set of its states S, a function
p: O× S×B(R)→ [0, 1], where B(R) is the set of all Borel subsets of R, cf. [21]—of values appearing
in measurements, cf. [2]. Restricting ourselves specifically to the Hilbert-space formulation of quantum
mechanics, each statistical operator ρ is decomposable into a non-trivial weighted sum of quantum
pure states represented by normalized vectors |ψ〉i ∈ H (cf. [5,18]) as ρi = |ψi〉〈ψi| that have no further
state decomposition; each statistical operator ρ also induces an expectation functional A 7→ tr(ρA) on
L(H), the space of linear operators on the Hilbert spaceH.
The probability p in the Copenhagen approach involves an explicit distinction between objective
and subjective aspects of physical states describable in this formalism and compares with that in
classical mechanics as follows. In classical mechanics, when needed at all, probability is used only in
situations where a detailed knowledge of the system is lacking, i.e., for statistical mechanics; in the
quantum context, the subjective aspect of probability also appears in such situations, which involve
state mixtures (Gemische, cf. [22] p. 9, [23] p. X) that are representable as statistical operators ρ but
not as pure ones. However, probability in QM on this approach is found also in the individual states
(Zustände, cf. [23]) as the objective aspect, representable as vectors |ψ〉 in H [23,24]. This objective
contribution to the quantum probability of a measurement outcome is provided specifically by the state
|ψ〉 = ∑i |ψi〉 via its complex amplitudes {ci}, now known as probability amplitudes, as their squared
magnitudes pi = |ci|2.
The quantities {pi} are understood as the probabilities of the measured system to be found to
possess actual respective values of its physical properties according to the rule of Born that is elemental
to the Copenhagen approach [25,26]. The measured value of a property is considered definite (actual),
as opposed to indefinite (potential) [5], as discussed in great detail in [14,15]; a dynamical property
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of a quantum system S becomes actual with probability pi upon precise measurement wherein the
measuring apparatus, A, must be in contact with the greater physical environment (the “the rest of the
world") and be classically describable or macroscopic (cf. [27] for a discussion of this notion and its
use in the Copenhagen interpretation and elsewhere more recently). In general, some member from
a set of possible values must occur in measurement, but the specific actual value measured appears
randomly [28], as discussed in Sections 4 and 5 here.
2.2. Quantum Indeterminacy
Another important element in the initial success of the Copenhagen approach is that it articulates
well the behavior of joint probabilities appearing in the “uncertainty relations,” a manifestation of
complementarity. Indeed, in Born’s view, “the factor that contributed [most]... to the speedy acceptance
of [the Copenhagen] interpretation of the ψ-function was a paper by Heisenberg [29] that contained his
celebrated uncertainty relations” [30]. The result of von Neumann that (sharp) observable quantities
are simultaneously measurable if and only if they commute with one another and if and only if they are
functions of a single observable later came to play a strong role in this understanding of such relations.
It has also been shown by Pekka Lahti [31] that Heisenberg’s joint indeterminacy hypothesis—the
“uncertainty principle” [29], later generalized by H. P. Robertson, [32], providing corresponding
“uncertainty” relations discussed in Section 2.4 below—together with an axiomatic formulation of
complementarity, when considered within the (O, S, p) framework formalized by George Mackey
[19] and M. J. Maczyn´ski [20], rigorously imply the existence of pairs of observables that cannot be
jointly sharply measured. The known set of such relations has recently expanded, as shown in the
next section.
The indeterminacy principle contrasts with the determinacy principle, that the magnitude of each
continuous quantity is determined by a real number, as is typically assumed in classical mechanics
(cf. Michael Dummett’s discussion of this principle in [33]). Note that the indeterminacy hypothesis
is a statement about the associated indeterminacy of incompatible observables not algebraically
commuting with each other (see Section 4 below), rather than the epistemic uncertainty regarding
an independent quantity per se. It is, therefore, a statement to the effect that the associated properties,
jointly considered, are objectively indefinite, as emphasized by Abner Shimony [34]; (cf. [35] Section 2.1).
It is a consequence of this indefiniteness that their measured values are also not precisely predictable,
that is, random in the sense explained in Section 5 below.
2.3. Quantum Potentia and Probability
In the Copenhagen approach, according to Heisenberg, the objective probability p, given by the
Born rule, relates to “statements about possibilities or better tendencies (‘potentia’...)” of the system
itself later to have certain actual values of measured properties [18] (p. 53). The subjective content of
these probabilities is “negligible” in the pure case, i.e., where trρ2 = 1, exactly when it is a projector,
which suffices for the maximal specification of the system’s actual properties; in this case, the elements
of the set of quantum probabilities {pi(O)} for the outcomes {oi} in a measurement of the observable
(i.e., Hermitian operator) O are
pi(O) = tr(Pi(O)ρ) = 〈ψ|Pi(O)|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|φi〉〈φi|ψ〉 (1)
which are the squared magnitudes of the corresponding complex-valued state-vector amplitudes
{ci = 〈φi|ψ〉}, that is, of the components of |ψ〉 in the eigenbasis {|φi〉} for O—the exclusivity of
this form being demonstrated rigorously by Andrew Gleason [21]; see Section 4.1 below. (Here, we
consider for simplicity the case of discrete properties; analogous relations hold in the continuous case.)
In particular, the complex probability amplitude ck corresponds to the potentia for actualization of
the specific property value ok upon the measurement of O, with pk(O) = |ck|2, something discussed
further in Section 4.3 below—cf. [14]. (Very recently, the notion of quantum potentia in a sense of res
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potentia related to that of Heisenberg has been used by Ruth Kastner et al. to offer a novel analysis of
quantum measurement, in combination with res extensa, purely physical substance, as “implicative
constituents of every quantum measurement event” [36].)
Recall that the novel characteristic of the quantum probability first to be discovered (n.b.
a mathematically precise treatment of its novelty in general terms has been given by Luigi Accardi
in [37]), which motivates the continual reconsideration of its relationship to traditional probability,
involves ostensibly disjoint events: An empirically measurable difference between the quantum
mechanical probability and the classical mechanical probability of a disjunction of such events is that
the associated probability is not, in general, additive in the quantum case. This is exhibited in the
appearance of a particle such as an electron at a spatial location x in the basic double-slit experiment
(cf. [38]) by passing first through a slit (Slit 1) and/or the other slit (Slit 2), which occurs with a
probability p12(x) that is related to the probability densities of reaching x in the alternatives of either
first passing through Slit 1, p1(x), or of first passing through Slit 2, p2(x):
p12(x) 6∝ p1(x) + p2(x). (2)
This quantum probability is the magnitude squared of the sum c12(x) = c1(x) + c2(x) of the complex
amplitudes {ci(x)} of those alternatives, rather than a simple sum of the probabilities of the two
alternative situations consistent with the future event, here detection at x.
Thus, the quantum probabilities do not arise by direct calculation from, for example, prior
probabilities of particle detection as in classical mechanics as a sum such as p12(x) ∝ p1(x) + p2(x) in
the situation of this double-slit experiment. (Another difference of quantum probability from classical
probability is found in joint probabilities is discussed in Section 3 below.)
2.4. Quantum Interference and Dispersion
The difference between the two sorts of probability, classical and quantum, is reflected clearly in
the corresponding probability density distribution in the detection plane in the double-slit experiment:
There is an additional modulated “interference term” arising because the ci(x) are complex-valued,
which precludes these probabilities from being given a straightforward Kolmogorovian representation
under a single probability measure (cf. [37] and [39] p. 125, [37] for detail regarding this), so that
p12(x) ∝ p1(x) + p2(x) +
√
p1(x)p2(x) cos
(
θ2(x)− θ1(x)
)
. (3)
In this situation, there is a range of possible values for the detected position, as well as of the
momentum of the system approaching it, that is, a certain dispersion of values due to its indeterminacy.
More generally, any observable given as an Hermitian operator A will have a dispersion
DispρA = 〈(A− 〈A〉I)2〉 = 〈A2〉 − 〈A〉2, for any system in state ρ; the indeterminacy relation of
Heisenberg for momentum and position relevant in this experiment was generalized by H. P. Robertson
so as to apply two any two observables A and B [29,32]:
〈(∆A)2〉〈(∆B)2〉 ≥ 1
4
|〈[A, B]〉|2 (4)
where the “uncertainty” of A for state ρ is ∆A ≡
√
DispρA. These relations are connected with
single-particle interferometric complementarities, i.e., between visibility and particle path, as shown
in the 1980s and 1990s; see the following section, Jaeger et al. [40] and references therein for more on
the relation to interferometry, and a recent analysis of Paul Busch and Christopher Shilladay [41] for
a detailed discussion of the various forms of complementarity.
Significant new developments regarding quantum probability that allow for the clearer explication
of these central aspects of the Copenhagen approach are discussed in the next two sections.
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3. Complementarity and Entanglement
The extraordinary behavior of quantum probabilities regarding compound systems due to
entanglement was brought to the forefront relatively early in the history of quantum mechanics (QM)
by Erwin Schrödinger [42,43] and remained the subject ongoing entirely theoretical discussions until
after John Bell produced his now-famous inequality, which was subsequently rendered experimentally
testable in a reformulation by John Clauser, Michael Horne, Abner Shimony, and Richard Holt
(CHSH) [44] and shown to be violated in an interferometric setting in the early 1980s by Alain
Aspect et al. [45].
An entanglement-related manifestation of complementarity involving joint probabilities was
noted later in the 1990s: When the two-particle interference visibility is unity, the one-particle
visibility is zero, and conversely as noted in the work of Marlan Scully, Berge Englert, and Herbert
Walther [6] and of Shimony, Horne, and Anton Zeilinger [46]. In the mid-1990s, it was shown that
the interferometric phenomena involved in the violation of CHSH inequalities obey a precise trade-off
relation, later experimentally verified in the 2000s [40,47,48], over a full range of different experimental
arrangements. This is also related to the fact that entanglement can be understood as an instance of the
uncertainty of quantum properties, cf. [41]. In particular, it was found by Jaeger and Shimony that there
is a general quantum interferometric complementarity relation between single-system interference
visibility, v1, and compound-system interference visibility, v12, for pairs of two-level systems, further
illustrating the surprising nature of quantum correlations exhibited in two-particle interference due to
the presence of entanglement [47], as first verified at the Boston University in 2001 [48].
This novel exhibition of complementarity can be understood concretely in terms of the washing
out of photon self-interference due to indeterminacy in the initial direction of individual particles
in a doubled discrete (Mach–Zehnder, MZ) two-“slit" arrangement with a source of particle pairs at
center simultaneously feeding two Mach–Zehnder interferometers, symmetrically oriented, with one
particle moving in one interferometer involving a generalized beamsplitter (transducer) at left and
similarly for the other particle moving in a second such interferometer at right (see [47] for figures).
Consider two particles A and B in this arrangement, with A taken to be that in beams 0 and/or 1,
and similarly for particle B (but indicated by primes below). Let each particle pair of the ensemble
involved be produced by the centrally located source in a possibly entangled two-particle pure state
|Θ〉 = γ1|0〉A|0′〉B + γ2|0〉A|1′〉B + γ3|1〉A|0′〉B + γ4|1〉A|1′〉B,with γi ∈ C such that |γ1|2 + |γ2|2 +
|γ3|2 + |γ4|2 = 1, |0〉A and |1〉A being basis vectors in the Hilbert space HA of the first particle
corresponding to the propagation of A to the left in beams 0 and 1 and |0′〉B and |1′〉B being similar
vectors in spaceHB of B moving to the right.
Let beams 0 and 1 be brought together at a transducer, TA (inducing a general unitary
transformation in the state space, not only a phase-shift+reflection/transmission as in a simple MZ
apparatus), feeding two output beams, an upper U and lower L beam in the MZ interferometer at
left, and let similar beams in the other interferometer to the right be brought together into another
transducer, TB (inducing a similar unitary transformation in the other particle’s state space), that feeds
two corresponding output beams U′ and L′; the joint, local operation of this pair of transducers is
described by the general pair of local unitary operations induced by them separately: T = TA ⊗ TB.
As these transducers TA and TB are varied, the probabilities P(UU′) of coincidence detection in beams
U and U′, and P(UL′), P(UL′), and P(LL′), as well as single-detection probabilities P(U), P(L), P(U′),
and P(L′)—corresponding to particle coincidence detection and single detection rates, respectively, in
the output beams of the pair of interferometer—are modulated.
The corresponding visibilities of interference were found to obey trade-off relations, quantifying
their complementaries. As T is varied over the full range of parameters for the two general local
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unitary transformations involved, continuously altering the apparatus, the one-particle interferometric
fringe visibility Vi (i = A, B) is found from the maximum and minimum probabilities of detection:
Vi =
[P(Y)]max − [P(Y)]min
[P(Y)]max + [P(Y)]min
, (5)
where Y = U, L. V12, the two-particle interferometric visibility in the sense of variations of detection
probability as the T is changed, is similarly calculable from the probabilities P(YY′) of occupation of
the joint-paths YY′, generalizing the case of the single paths Y. For example,
V12 =
[P¯(UU′)]max − [P¯(UU′)]min
[P¯(UU′)]max + [P¯(UU′)]min
(6)
where P¯(UU′) = P(UU′)− P(U)P(U′) + 14 represents nonaccidental coincidence probabilities; likewise
for the three other possible path pairs YY′ [47].
When the two systems, A and B, are entangled, one has the non-factoring joint probability
P(UU′) 6= P(U)P(U′), (7)
as do the other joint probabilities P(UL′), P(LU′), and P(LL′); the extraordinarily highly correlated
behavior of particles A and B arises due to entanglement, and one finds that a strong complementarity
trade-off relation, taking the form of an equality [47], holds for all |Θ〉, namely,
V212 +V
2
A = 1 ; V
2
12 +V
2
B = 1 ; (8)
this was subsequently experimentally confirmed by Bahaa Saleh and associates at Boston
University [48,49]. This explicitly demonstrates precise quantum complementarity involving entangled
systems of the sort violating the Bell and CHSH inequalities.
4. Quantum Measurement
In the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics, “the behaviour of the measuring apparatus
must be capable of being registered as something actual. . . if the measuring apparatus is to be used
as a measuring instrument at all. . . the connection with the external world is. . . necessary” [5] (p. 27);
any fully quantum A and S alone would become entangled, something Don Howard has argued Bohr
was already noting in 1927 [13], and neither S nor A+S can be considered closed during measurement.
Indeed, in a fully quantum formal treatment of such a process, the apparatus would itself have to
be measured in order to provide an outcome, and so on. In this approach, a fully formal quantum
mechanical treatment of the measurement process utilizing a closed system description or without
the use of classical descriptions for at least some elements of the measurement process is considered
impossible—quantum mechanics is literally incapable of being used to account for all details of the
process (n.b.: the adjective sometimes used in relation to this is often translated as uncontrollable in
English, but is better translated as unaccountable-for.) Moreover, the objective, probabilistic aspect
of quantum state evolution invoked upon actualization is considered irreducible to any amount of
ignorance that might be removed using the theory alone, as mentioned in Section 2.
In the Copenhagen approach, any system S, as well as the joint system of S and any other quantum
piece of apparatus A thought of as distinct from A, is an open system while being measured, because it
must be coupled to the larger world to provide an actual measurement record. A coupling of quantum
system S to classically describable devices—Heisenberg’s recording system plus the rest of the world, which
physically intervene when using an apparatus in such a way that one among a set of differing outcomes
can appear on the resulting record—is held to characterize measurement, and this coupling gives rise to
a probabilistic, indeterministic state change (corresponding to the actualization of the system property)
that relates to the actual value in a prescribed way (described by the EE link, see Section 4.2, below).
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Actualization (discussed in Section 4.3) begins with the coupling of the system under measurement to
the classically describable observational apparatus in the world, which is physically designed (based
on rigorous testing for reliability) to elicit an outcome, and ends upon decoupling, leaving a classically
describable physical record of the outcome.
If one does consider, contra the views of Bohr and Heisenberg, a fully quantum mechanical
closed system treatment of measurement, the behavior of the joint system A+S, or a larger chain of
interactions systems (see below), this might be expected to suffice for the description of measurement.
Such a treatment is often given as follows; cf. e.g., [17], [50] (Section 2.4). One prepares system S
via a series of physical interactions, such as filtering, in some well-defined quantum state |η〉, after
which it is arranged to interact with a measurement apparatus, A. This apparatus, after being similarly
arranged to be in a fiducial initial state |χ0〉, would be required to enter a final state corresponding
to the value of a pointer property Z, which must be correlated with the value of the measured
property (non-degenerate observable) E of the system. We may consider, for simplicity, a discrete
measured property
E = ∑i ei|ψi〉〈ψi|
where {|ψi〉} is a countable orthonormal basis for the system Hilbert space H corresponding to its
eigenvalues {ei}. Another typical requirement for such a measurement is that a “calibration condition”
be satisfied, namely, that if a measured property is real, then its value must be exhibited properly,
unambiguously, and with certainty: if system S is an eigenstate |ψk〉 of E, then the state of apparatus
A after the interaction of the two is an eigenstate of Z (with an eigenbasis {|φi〉} associated with
pointer readings zi), which serves to indicate the specific value of E present, the free-Hamiltonian
function contribution to the evolution of the system being considered negligible relative to that of
the measurement interaction. For quantum observables, the calibration condition generally takes the
form of a probability reproducibility condition, namely, that a probability measure exists for a property
be transcribed onto that of the corresponding apparatus pointer property. Finally, registration of the
measured property by the measurement apparatus is taken to include the physical reading out of the
registered value.
If one formally considers an entire chain of interacting objects connecting the system S up as far
as physically conceivable, to the brain of an experimenter, for example X, Y,. . . , in the environment in
addition to the original measurement system S and the experimenter’s apparatus A—such as focusing
elements, counter or counters, various cables, a computer, output display, etc.—a good measurement
would involve all these becoming correlated in their properties for the measurement outcome to be
physically indicated. Under the Schrödinger state evolution, which is unitary, upon completion of the
measurement interactions, one would then find
|Ψ〉 =∑ ci|si〉|ai〉|xi〉|yi〉 . . . , (9)
with {si}, {ai}, {xi}, {yi} etc. as the Hilbert space eigenbases for S, A, X, Y,. . ., respectively. The
result of considering all physical systems involved entirely quantum mechanically is simply a regress
backward from the prepared state, which presents and indefinite value of the quantity to be observed.
Heisenberg had already engaged this difficulty early on (in 1935 [51], cf. [52]) in a Copenhagenist
spirit by insisting on a bipartite division of a set of different systems involved, only one of which
is to be considered in any one analysis among all those possible, one for each way of making a
bipartite division of the above chain, and considering only one side of the division quantum mechanically,
as described below, cf. [51]. Again, for him, consideration of the entire measurement chain—or even
simply the system and portion of apparatus in direct contact with it—as a full accounting of the
measurement process as described within the state-vector formalism, as done in the above, without
truncation, is an inappropriate use of the quantum formalism, the proper role of which is to make
predictions of measurement outcomes; the only plausible use of the quantum formalism for the purposes
of symbolizing a measurement process requires the introduction of a cut or split (Schnitt) between
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what is considered the measured portion of this chain of systems on the side including the entity S and
the remainder, considered then to be a single, classically describable measuring system.
Notably, a change in the location of the cut makes no difference to the statistics obtained for
the purposes of prediction. This formal description is strictly speaking only a symbolic description
of the elements of the world involved. Heisenberg also imposed an important condition restricting
this location: “The claim . . . that it is indifferent at which location the cut between the parts of the
system to be treated quantum mechanically and the classical measuring devices should be drawn,
should thus be made more precise in the sense that this cut may indeed be shifted arbitrarily far in the
direction of the observer in the region that is otherwise described according to the laws of classical
physics; but that this cut cannot be shifted arbitrarily in the direction of the atomic system. Rather,
there are physical systems—and all atomic systems belong among these—that the classical concepts are
unsuitable to describe, and whose behaviour can therefore be expressed correctly only in the language
of wavefunctions” [51], cf.[53].
In this way, the chain of statistical correlations appearing in the formal representation of the state
|Ψ〉 is considered to be cut in two—into a system S′ and the remainder A′—somewhere along this
chain of interacting systems, with subsystems to one side of the cut collectively considered the system
to be measured: S′ subsumes S together with all other subsystems left of the cut, and A′(=A + W)
is the collective of those systems right of the cut, that is, the “apparatus plus the rest of the world”
W. Thus, A′, is removed from the quantum-physical description used to make predictions relating
to outcomes, with the cut always being made somewhere within S–X–Y–· · · –A–W, where a classical
description is possible for the entire portion including the recording system. The actualization of
potentia requires an interaction of S′ (the size of S or larger) with the classically describable measuring
apparatus, itself in interaction with the rest of the world. Formally, the change of state of the measured
system involved is sometimes said to be “projected” to the appropriate component of the initially
prepared system state, that is to be attributed by the eigenvalue-eigenstate link (discussed below in
Section 4.2). Such a projection involves a change of state differing from the unitary evolution predicted
when using the Schrödinger law of motion alone, for any non-trivial measurement.
It should be noted, however, that the Copenhagen approach to measurement can be criticized
for not offering, indeed, for denying the possibility of a complete, closed system description of the
measurement process or, for that matter, even precisely specifying the conditions under which
measurement will occur, for example, due to the unclear boundary between the classical and the
quantum realms, by its reliance on the requirements of the use of a macroscopic apparatus and
the production of classically describable records of reliable measuring instruments not precisely
characterizable by quantum mechanics. For this reason, Heisenberg’s appeal to actualization (discussed
in Section 4.3) can be considered an incomplete quantum mechanical treatment. Moreover, descriptions
of the sort given by Heisenberg in the above have been criticized for conflating measurement with
state preparation, as Henry Margenau did already in 1936 [54].
Let us turn now to Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relations. In the presentation of the indeterminacy
relations in Heisenberg’s 1929 Chicago lectures, published as The Physical Principles of the Quantum
Theory [29], in which he spoke only of the Der Kopenhagener Geist der Quantentheorie rather than a full
interpretation, the indeterminacy relations were, strictly speaking, only symbolic in nature and in the
process of being generalized (beginning with work by H. P. Robertson [32] discussed in Section 2 above).
These relations were placed on a firm mathematical grounding soon thereafter in the Hilbert-space
formalism; cf. Section 2.4. Recently, notably since the final explication of the Copenhagen approach by
Heisenberg in the 1950s [5], these relations have been analyzed, extended, and clarifed via the notion
of unsharpness in a way that captures the notion of quantum indeterminacy more efficaciously.
4.1. Unsharpness
The maximally specified state of a quantum system relative to an observable O in the Copenhagen
approach can be given as a projector ρpure = |ψ〉〈ψ| appearing in the spectral decomposition of
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an observable O, as discussed in Section 2.1; cf. [2,55]. Nonetheless, in addition to measurements
corresponding to such operators, unsharp measurements have also been formalized as the class of
quantum operations that are described by (normalized) positive-operator-valued measures (POVMs)
developed by Günther Ludwig, Karl Kraus, Busch, and Lahti [17,56,57].
Given a nonempty set S and a σ-algebra Σ of its subsets Xm, a POVM E is a collection of operators
{E(Xm)} satisfying the conditions: (i) Positivity—E(Xm) ≥ E(∅), for all Xm ∈ Σ; (ii) Additivity—for
all countable sequences of disjoint sets Xm in Σ, E(∪mXm) = ∑m E(Xm); (iii) Completeness—E(S) = I.
If the value space (S,Σ) of a POVM E is a subspace of the real Borel space (R,B(R)), then E provides
a unique Hermitian operator on H, namely ∫R Id dE, where Id is the identity map. The positive
operators E(Xm) in the range of a POVM are referred to as effects E(H) = {A ∈ L(H) : O ≤ A ≤ I},
the expectation values of which provide the quantum probabilities.
Given an effect A, one can define properties in general by the following set of conditions. (i) There
exists a property A⊥; (ii) there exist states ρ and ρ′ such that both tr(Aρ) > 12 and tr(Aρ
′) > 12 ; (iii) if
A is regular, for any effect B below A and A⊥, 2B ≤ A + A⊥ = I, where a regular effect is an effect with
spectrum both above and below 12 . Thus, the set of properties is Ep(H) = {A ∈ E(H)|A  12I, A 
1
2I} ∪ {O, I}; the set of unsharp properties is Eu(H) ≡ E(H)p/L(H). A POVM is an unsharp observable if
there exists an unsharp property in its range [2]. The POVMs are the natural correspondents in the
operator space of quantum mechanics of standard probability measures and thereby make precise the
notion of indeterminacy in the Hilbert-space setting.
The probability of a given outcome m upon a (generalized) measurement on a system in a pure
state P(|ψ〉) is given by
p(m) = 〈ψ|E(Xm)|ψ〉 = tr
(
(|ψ〉〈ψ|)E(Xm)
)
; (10)
cf. Equation (1), which holds for the case of sharp measurement. The effects form a convex subset of
the space of linear operators on L(H) on the system Hilbert space, the extremal elements of this subset
being the projectors {Pi}. A collection of effects is said to be coexistent if the union of their ranges is
contained within the range of a POVM. Any two quantum observables E1 and E2 are representable as
sharp measures on (R,B(R)) exactly when [E1, E2] = O, following from the results of von Neumann
for Hermitian operators [23] mentioned in Section 2 above; coexistent observables are thus those that
can be measured simultaneously in a common measurement arrangement, and when two observables are
coexistent, there exists an observable, the statistics of which contain those of both observables, the joint
observable. Typically, the two observables are recoverable as marginals of a joint distribution on the
product of the corresponding two outcome spaces.
The introduction of unsharpness allows one to circumvent the requirement of commutativity of
jointly measurable properties, which captures only the extremes of complementarity, by including the
unsharp properties, and enables a continuous range of complementarity to be captured in the Hilbert
space formalism. For POVMs, commutativity remains sufficient but is not necessary for the coexistence
of effects (cf. [2]). It has been shown that “smeared versions” of two noncommuting observables can
still have a joint observable. For example, the operators F = { 12 (I ± fσz)} and G = { 12 (I ± gσz)}
have a joint observable precisely when f 2 + g2 ≤ 1. Therefore, as a requirement for this pair to be
jointly observable, the magnitudes | f |, |g| (their degrees of unsharpness) must be complementary,
in accordance with this trade-off relation, as demonstrated by Busch and Shilladay [41].
The introduction of POV measures and unsharpness have thus helped make indeterminacy and
mathematical complementarity more precise by exploiting the Hilbert-space setting; cf. [41] for further
detail on the intertwined connection and contrast between those two notions and more detail on
their role in understanding joint measurability of properties in experimental situations, such as the
single-particle Mach-Zehnder interferometry, not discussed here.
4.2. Linking Actual and Possible Values
In the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics, the state of a measured system is related to
the actual values obtained in measurement by what has come to be known as the eigenvalue-eigenstate
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(EE) link. The essence of the EE link was first introduced by Heisenberg and then used by others
including Dirac in 1930 and after; cf. the careful explanation of this by Marian Gilton [58]. In the 1930
version of Dirac’s Quantum mechanics, one finds the following:
“If a state ψr and an observable α are such that, when an observation is made of the
observable with the system in this state the result is certain to be the number a, we assume
this information can be expressed by the equation
αψr = aψr (11)
Conversely, when an equation of this type is given, we assume it has the physical meaning
that a measurement of the observable α with the system in state ψr will certainly give for
result the number a or that the observable α has the value a for the state ψr, to use a classical
way of speaking, which is permissible in this case” [24] (p. 30).
In 1958, in the 4th edition of his classic textbook Quantum Mechanics, which appeared after
Heisenberg’s article “The Development of the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics,” one finds the
EE link connected explicitly with probability.
“The expression that an observable ‘has a particular value’ for a particular state is permissible
in quantum mechanics in the special case when a measurement of the observable is certain
to lead to the particular value, so that the state is in an eigenstate of the observable . . .
In the general case we cannot speak of an observable having a value for a particular
state, but we can speak of its having an average value for the state. We can go further
and speak of the probability of its having any specified value for the state, meaning the
probability of this specified value being obtained when one makes a measurement of the
observable.” [59] (p. 253)
4.3. Causation, Possibility, and Actuality
Like other sorts of probability, quantum probability can be viewed as the “graded possibility”
of the occurrence of events, as first suggested by Leibniz [60,61]. Moreover, in the Copenhagen
approach to quantum mechanics, unlike others, possibility plays a fundamental role in relating theory
to experiment. This was explicitly indicated by Heisenberg in his invocation of an aspect of Aristotle’s
theory of causation, wherein possibility appears prominently in relation to all phenomena: “. . . in
modern physics the concept of possibility, that played such a decisive role in Aristotle’s philosophy,
has moved again into a central place” [62] (p. 298).
As pointed out in Section 2 above, the isolated quantum system, described by a state-vector
|ψ〉 ∈ H, “no longer contains features connected with the observer’s knowledge. . . it is also completely
abstract . . . and the representation becomes a part of the description of Nature only by being linked
to the question of how real or possible experiments will result” [5] (p. 26). The objective aspect of
probability is that of quantifying the likelihood |ci|2 of the appearance of each value among any set of
possible measurement outcomes as the actual result in the actualization of the potential physical state
which occurs upon measurement, which according to Heisenberg is independent of any subjectivity:
“the transition from the ‘possible’ to the ‘actual’ takes place as soon as the interaction between the
object and the measuring device, and thereby with the rest of the world, has come into play; it is not
connected with the act of registration of the result in the mind of the observer” [18] (pp. 54–55).
Heisenberg explained the objective character of this registration process as follows.“Of course,
the introduction of the observer must not be misunderstood to imply that some kind of subjective
features are to be brought into the description of Nature. The observer has rather only the function of
registering decisions, i.e., processes in space and time, and it does not matter whether the observer is
an apparatus or a human being; but the registration, i.e., the transition from the possible to the actual,
is absolutely necessary here, and cannot be omitted from the interpretation of the quantum theory.
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It must also be pointed out that in this respect the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory is
in no way positivistic. For whereas positivism is based on sensual perceptions of the observer as
elements of reality, the Copenhagen interpretation regards things and processes which are describable
in terms of classical concepts, i.e., the actual, as the foundation of any physical interpretation.” [5]
(p. 22). Thus, Heisenberg neither requires nor refers to the mind, the brain, or human knowledge for
the actualization of potential values, which appear in successful measurements as actual values of an
observable inferrable from a resulting classically describable record in accordance with the EE-link;
only the interaction of the measured system with the greater world in a way so as to produce such a
classical record is required. It is such a record from which the mind could later acquire knowledge if
the recorded, classically describable measurement outcome is later attended to.
Measurement of a quantum system precludes the state change that would otherwise occur were
it to remain isolated, that is, the time-evolution according to the Schrödinger law of motion. It is
in this way that, in the Copenhagen approach to QM, the possible becomes the actual and can be
recorded, according to Heisenberg—a way not necessarily captured by the evolution dictated by the
law of motion; it is often said that it is at this point that causation fails in QM—that it becomes acausal.
However, this non-deterministic change of state-vector evolution arises precisely with the intervention
of the measuring apparatus and the rest of the world participating in the production of a classical
record of the outcome as its cause.
Hence, the Copenhagen approach to non-relativistic quantum mechanics presented by Heisenberg
is not one in which there is a genuine lack of causation; instead, there is a form of Aristotelian causation
that is not captured by the fundamental law of motion, which only governs closed systems not being
measured—in particular, it is the form Aristotle calls chance causation, as I have argued in [14,15]:
In the actualization of potentiality, there is a single chance occurrence that lies within the set of possible
occurrences for the system in question according to the characteristics of its Hilbert-space description,
with a measured value capable of being recorded on a system that is also classically describable but
unpredictable [5]. It is in this way that the Copenhagen approach remains, in a specific sense, causative.
This approach to quantum probability, where it fundamentally involves possibility, has recently been
connected with logic in relation to the possible experience to be gained through measurement, as shown
in the next subsection.
4.4. Logic and Indeterminacy
In the Copenhagen approach, the quantum state is taken to characterize as completely as possible
the system to which it is attributed. The changes in the world occurring in any measurement are
changes of values of quantities that were theretofore potential, that is, only possibly possessed,
in accordance with the EE link connecting possible and actual observed values of observables.
Empirically, the probabilities of these various outcomes to occur accord with the likelihoods of
obtaining the set of possible outcomes for measurements in the future correspond formally to the
Hermitian operator O, in measurements on collections of identically prepared systems described by the
state |ψ〉 with the resulting measurement record being classically describable when necessary for their
readout. These probabilities have been connected to logic; cf. [1] (Chapter 8). Indeed, the results of the
early work of von Neumann and Birkhoff associates propositions to quantum Hilbert (sub)spaces [63]
and the field of quantum logic that arose from that pioneering work; cf. [64] for a general summary of
later developments.
4.4.1. Completeness of the Quantum State Description
Whether the quantum state was indeed complete, despite the apparent incompatibility of this
with the attribution of precise values to all observable quantities, remained unclear until the work
of Simon Kochen and Ernst Specker in 1967 [65]. Their theorem now known as the Kochen-Specker
theorem precludes a consistent truth-valuation from being given to the propositions identified by von
Neumann and Birkhoff, which is what is required to satisfy the corresponding value-definiteness thesis,
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namely, (i) that each and every physical magnitude have a definite value at all times (see Alan Stairs’
valuable discussion [66]) and (ii) that measurements reveal those preexisting precise values; cf. [50]
(Section 2.3) for a discussion of related issues. The value-definiteness condition can be stated more
formally: Each proposition regarding the system, of the form “O ∈ ∆,” where O describes the physical
magnitude and ∆ is a Borel subset of the real numbers, is given a definite value 0 or 1.
The work of Kochen and Specker followed a very general theorem of Andrew Gleason [21]: All
probability measures that can be defined on the lattice of quantum propositions from the quantum
statistical operators, that is all quantum probabilities, are of the form p(Pi) = tr(ρPi), for some statistical
operator ρ on Hilbert spaceH, for allH of dimension greater than two. This result demonstrates that
every probability measure over the set of quantum state projectors is one from a quantum state ρ on
theH attributed to the system in question; the trace measure tr(ρPi) assigns to each projector Pi the
dimension of its range, which can then be normalized by the dimension of the (finite-d) H. It can,
therefore, be obtained by taking ρ to be the maximally mixed state on H. This shows that the only
natural generalization of Kolmogorov probability functions of the sort used in quantum mechanics
is exactly that of the Hilbert-space formulation of quantum mechanics. The values corresponding to
orthogonal projectors thus obey a Born-type rule for the assignment of probabilities.
States for which definite truth-values could be attributed to all observables are the so-called
dispersion-free states, states for which projectors take expectation values of only either 0 or 1 under
the above mapping. Following a presentation first given by Bell, we can relate this to Gleason’s
work [67]. The condition ∑i〈P(|φi〉)〉 = 1 implies that both 0 and 1 occur because (1) there are no other
possible values for satisfying the condition and (2) neither alone suffices. However, then, there must be
arbitrarily close pairs |ψ〉, |φ〉 having different expectation values, 0 and 1 respectively; however, such
pairs cannot be arbitrarily close, by the above lemma. Hence, there can be no dispersion-free states
providing the statistics of quantum statistics. Accordingly, no variables parameterizing dispersion-free
probability measures can exist for systems having H [67]. The set of quantum states is therefore
complete, because it provides the probability measures definable on the quantum propositional lattice.
Consider the complete set of Hermitian self-adjoint operators for the set of quantum states
describing a system attributed a Hilbert space with dimension d > 2, constraining their algebra to
reflect the values assigned, and take the assignment of the values of real numbers to the quantum
operators to reflect corresponding properties of the system. In this setting, the Kochen–Specker
theorem demonstrates the impossibility of such an assignment for a finite sublattice of quantum
propositions [65]. Take a value function, vψ connecting an observable O to a value of a physical
magnitude O when a system is in a state ψ, that is, vψ : O → R. Define F(O) to be the value
associated with F(O) for all functions F with a one-to-one, onto mapping from values of O to O. Taking
vψ(F(O)) = F(vψ(O)) has the consequence that vψ is additive and multiplicative on commuting
operators with the consequence that vψ(I) for all states ψ as long as there is at least one magnitude O
for which vψ(O) = 0 (cf. [68], pp. 191–192). Another consequence of this is that vψ(Pi) must be either 0
or 1 for all propositions Pi, which have corresponding projectors Pi. Thus, if one considers a resolution
of the identity into a set of projectors {Pi}, that is, this set is such that ∑i Pi = I, in an interpretation of
quantum properties where one and only one of the corresponding magnitudes Pi can take the value 1,
no such function exists except for an overly restricted class of properties.
The results of Gleason as well as Kochen and Specker thus support the basic Copenhagen
assumption that the quantum state is complete. Note also that the Kochen–Specker result can
be extended to general von Neumann algebras, as shown by Andreas Doring et al. in [69], with
implications quantum and generalized probabilistic models, as noted by Federico Holik et al. in [70].
4.4.2. Logical Quantum Indeterminacy Relations
More recent work of Itamar Pitowsky has shown that this connection can be placed in the
context of indeterminacy to provide a new class of trade-off relations exhibiting complementarity in
logical context. In his investigation, Pitowsky began by noting that George Boole, in developing his
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conception of probability, identified necessary and sufficient conditions for a set of rational numbers
p1, p2, ..., pn to represent properly the probabilities, considered (relative) frequencies, of the occurrence
of a set of n logically connected events E1, . . . En [71] pi = prob(Ei) i = 1, 2, ..., n to express what
Boole called “conditions of possible experience” [72]. These conditions are either linear inequalities
or equalities in p1, p2, . . . , pn; if the events under consideration are entirely independent, then the
fractions corresponding to probabilities might be constrained only by the conditions pi ≥ 0, pi ≤ 1 ,
but the expression for sets within possible experience must take the simple form
a +
N
∑
i
ai pi ≥ 0 (12)
where a, ai are constants involving the logical relations constraining them [72].
This set of conditions on probabilities lie within n-dimensional polytopes in the case of
probabilities of correlation, the convex hull of a finite number of points in Rd, that is, the set of all
convex combinations of its points [73]. Any violation of these conditions is manifested geometrically
by the location of points (corresponding to probabilities) outside of the polytope dictated by them.
The conditions on possible experience can then be methodically constructed from the logical relations
among sets of possible events. Take, for example, a pair of events E1, E2 having relative frequencies
p1, p2, again taking p12 to denote the frequency of the joint event E1 ∩ E2. Being probabilities, these
numbers have the relations: p1 ≥ p12, p2 ≥ p12, p12 ≥ 0. The frequency of the disjoint event E1 ∪ E2
is then p1 + p2 − p12 with
p1 + p2 − p12 ≤ 1 . (13)
One then has a corresponding three-dimensional space of vectors (p1, p2, p12) that can be viewed as
a convex polytope with vertices (0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), and (1, 1, 1). Pitowksy considered a set of
measurements known to have as outcomes 0 and 1, such as the measurements on a squared value S2i
of the component of spin along orthogonal spatial directions for a spin-1 system.
In this case, the basic operators Si do not commute and so cannot be precisely measured
simultaneously, while their squares do, cf. Pitowsky’s [74]. Their sum S2 = 2I, where I is the
identity, so that in a simultaneous measurement of these spin-squared operators, one and only one of
these observables will have the value 0, while the others take value 1. This illustration of the general
situation corresponds to measurements with a triple of possible outcomes. Let the events that appear
in more than one measurement be written as Ei, and let those that appear in only one triple be Fi.
Suppose the noncontextuality of probability—the requirement that probability assignments do not
depend on the outcomes of measurements of other observables that might be measured at the same
time, cf. [75,76], and assign the same probability to each event above in all cases. Given that the
probabilities in each triple of possible outcomes must also sum to one, one then finds
p(E1) + p(E2) + p(F2) = 1 (14)
p(E1) + p(E3) + p(F3) = 1 (15)
p(E2) + p(E4) + p(E6) = 1 (16)
p(E3) + p(E5) + p(E7) = 1 (17)
p(E6) + p(E7) + p(F1) = 1 (18)
p(E4) + p(E8) + p(F4) = 1 (19)
p(E5) + p(E8) + p(F5) = 1. (20)
These requirements on probability then imply trade-off inequalities expressing complementarity,
for example,
p(E1) + p(E8) ≤ 3/2 . (21)
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One of the two outcomes E1 and E8—which cannot arise as alternative outcomes of the same
measurement—becomes more certain, that is, there is an increased probability of occurrence. The other
outcome becomes less certain, with a decreased probability of occurrence. This is a logic-based
indeterminacy relation quantitatively expressing that the likelihoods of positive results in alternative
measurement arrangements are complementary quantities [74].
Here again, a novel sort of indeterminacy relation was obtained and given in the clear
mathematical form of a trade-off relation—this in addition to the others introduced and developed after
the advent of the Copenhagen approach. This new sort of relation arises from the consideration of a
collection of sets of alternative events in Boolean logic within single measurements, with the two events
involved resulting from a collection of such measurements as outcomes of different measurements, as
discussed in [77]. Like those discussed in the previous section, this result furthers the significance the
Copenhagen approach’s notions of complementarity and indeterminacy by revealing their appearance
beyond its original mathematical locus, further demonstrating its fundamental significance.
5. Indeterminism and Randomness
Classical physics has most often been thought to be deterministic in the following sense,
introduced by Laplace in the following statement. “We ought. . . to regard the present state of the
universe as the effect of its anterior state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one
instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the
respective situation of the beings who compose it—an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these
data to analysis—it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the
universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain, and the future, as well
as the past, would be present to its eyes.” [78]. Under the conditions set out in this statement of the
notion, perfect predictions and retrodictions regarding the behavior of individual physical systems are
possible, in principle.
The determination of future (and past) events involved here is identified with in-principle
predictability under the assumption that unlimited resources are available to the predictor, P: It involves
in its application the existence of an intelligence with unlimited capabilities, both physical and
computational. However, this is something beyond the scope of the practice of physics from within
the universe: Finite beings—with finiteness assessed via the physical and/or cognitive resources at
their disposal—are inherently limited in their ability to predict physical events, given that prediction
requires computational resources; in any application of physical theory, such as prediction, any finite
agent can exploit only finite physical resources for this purpose.
5.1. Predictability
Although the contraints on the resources of finite beings do not always present difficulties for
precisely predicting a given future event among a given finite set of events in classical mechanics,
even unlimited resources do not suffice for quantum mechanics to be considered a deterministic theory
according to the above classic definition and that even when one among a finite set of alternatives
need be distinguished. An alternative, more physically straightforward definition of determinism
applicable to quantum mechanics would therefore be superior, in particular, one more suitable to
physics and independent of radical assumptions about the availability of computional and other
resources. One such a definition that has been suggested is: A scientific theory is deterministic if and
only if in that theory any two trajectories in the state space in models of systems overlap at one point
do overlap at every point, and it is indeterministic if and only if it is not deterministic (cf. discussion
in [79–81]).
Judging this within the (O, S, p) framework of general physics, one sees that quantum mechanics
is not a theory supporting determinism of this latter kind for individual, measured systems, but at best
provides precise predictions of the behavior of collections of identically prepared and subsequently
measured systems: On the Copenhagen approach, quantum measurement of physical properties are
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understood to introduce a probabilistic change of physical state that precludes the state-trajectory
overlap required by this definition. The “acausality”—as it was often called early in the history of
the approach—of this quantum state evolution is responsible for the indeterminism of the states
actually appearing from among those possible beforehand as the result of measurement. The states
connected with measurement data are always those dictated by following the EE link rule, which offers
an alternative to indeterminacy (“uncertainty”) relations for capturing the objective indefiniteness
of physical properties. As explained in Section 4.3 above, the Copenhagen approach provides
an Aristotelian form of causation for this process even in the presence of chance.
5.2. Randomness
Despite the clarity gained by the move to a trajectory-based version of determinism, predictability
remains relevant to the question of the randomness of the appearance of measurement outcomes.
Note that a crucial distinction exists between indeterminism and unpredictability: Predictability
hinges on the total context of prediction of P—be that a human or another sort of cognitive agent
such as an artificially intelligent robot—including the all the conditions of the experimental context.
Indeterminism, in the trajectory-based definition just discussed, involves only the theoretical character
of the theory involved, here QM, specifically regarding the topology of state-space trajectories,
independently of whether or how they could, if ever, come to be known. The randomness appearing
in quantum mechanics should not be identified with essentially probabilistic state evolution, that is,
indeterminism, as noted by Geoffrey Hellman [82], because indeterminism is not a necessary condition
for the appearance of randomness in a theory.
Randomness can be defined as maximal unpredictability, and the Copenhagen approach
provides a consistent understanding of the notions of indeterminism and unpredictability matching
this conception well. A notion of predictability that accords with one of the distinguishing
characteristics of the approach, namely, the involvement not only of the measurement apparatus
but also the large world (environment) of the measurement apparatus in the very definition of proper
measurement (cf. [5,10,14]), has been recently introduced by Anthony Eagle [81], namely, this physical
process definition:
“A prediction function p(S, t) takes as input the current state S of a system described by
a theory T as discerned by a predictor P and an elapsed time t, and yields a temporally
indexed probability distribution Prt over the space of possible states of the system.
A prediction is a specific use of some prediction function by some predictor on some initial
state S0 and time t0 who adopts Prt as their posterior credence function conditionally on the
evidence and the theory.” [81]
This definition of predictability when applied using the probabilities of outcomes of quantum
measurements allows their random character to be explicated.
The randomness in quantum mechanics in the Copenhagen approach can be understood
specifically as follows. Let P be any experimenter performing a measurement, let T be the quantum
mechanics, let |a0〉 be the the quantum state attributed to the pertinent system via the preparation
procedure used by P at time t0, and let t be the time elapsed between its preparation and the completion
of the measurement. Predictor P will use the appropriate choice of quantum probability as his/her
p(|a0〉, t), according to the circumstances of the measurement it performs, that a given outcome b
obtains, and use it in finding his posterior credence function given his entire background knowledge.
In particular, one can apply the following definition of unpredictability: “An event E (at some temporal
distance t) is unpredictable for a predictor P if and only if P’s posterior credence in E after conditioning
on current evidence and the best prediction function available to P is not 1, that is, if the prediction
function yields a posterior probability distribution that does not assign probability 1 to E” [81].
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Given, in particular, that measurement results are unpredictable in this sense whenever
incompatible observables are measured in succession, one then has a well defined sense of randomness
that applies to quantum mechanics:
“An event E is random for a predictor P using theory T if and only if E is maximally
unpredictable. An event E is maximally unpredictable for P and T if and only if the posterior
probability of E yielded by the prediction functions that T makes available, conditional on
current evidence, is equal to the prior probability of E. This also means that P’s posterior
credence in E, conditional on theory and current evidence (the current state of the system),
must be equal to P’s prior credence in E conditional only on theory.”
where E is the appearance of the eigenvalue b as the measurement outcome. The quantum
measurement process is then seen to be random when successive measurements of non-commuting
sharp observables are made: Knowledge of the outcome obtained for state preparation via
measurement of given quantum observable does not provide additional information about the
outcomes of measurements of a sharp observable with which it does not commute, such as when
the x-spin of a spin-1/2 particle is measured just after its z-spin is measured, for example, using
a Stern-Gerlach apparatus.
The general notion of randomness is as an extrinsic property of events that is dependent on
properties of agents such as P—and, more importantly, the scientific communities they form—and the
theories they use pertaining to all elements involved in their scientific activity. However, it only requires
that an account of how probability influences credence need not involve an interpretation of probability
that itself depends on credence, and in no way requires a subjective interpretation of the probability
attributed by quantum mechanics; it only recognizes that predictability expressed via Prt is epistemic in
character, cf. [81]. This notion is one that the reinforces the Copehagen approach: The randomness in
quantum theory is evidenced in relation to measurements when two non-commuting sharp observables
are measured in succession. The result of the second measurement is maximally unpredictable using
the law of motion to predict it on the basis of the result of the first measurement and any other
information obtained from the world external to the system.
6. Conclusions
Results from the investigation of the behavior of quantum probability in a range of novel
circumstances after Heisenberg’s clarification of the elements of the Copenhagen interpretation
in the mid-1950s were shown to clarify further the nature and identity of the forms of causation,
indeterminacy, and randomness that the interpretation attributes to quantum mechanics. A number of
novel trade-off relations quantifying complementarity in additional areas of mathematics and physics
were reviewed and described, as was the introduction of a number of mathematical constructions
making indeterminacy more precise and extending its application. Results showing that the chancy
nature of the results of measurements on quantum systems, and hence of the appearance of the
quantum state, can be explicated in a way that accords with the Aristotelian form of causation
introduced by Heisenberg in his late explication of the Copenhagen interpretation were also reviewed.
These various developments in theoretical physics, some of which also bear directly on experimental
physics, that appeared subsequent to Heisenberg’s clarification were in this way shown to demonstrate
the continually increasing value to physics of the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics.
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